Abstract-We show that Kripke semantics of modal logic, manifest in the syntactic proof formalism of labeled sequent calculi, can be used to solve three central problems in access control: Generating evidence for denial of access (countermodel generation), finding all consequences of a policy (saturation) and determining which additional credentials will allow an access (abduction). At the core of our work is a single, non-trivial, countermodel producing decision procedure for a specific access control logic. The procedure is based on backwards search in a labeled sequent calculus for the logic. Modifications of the calculus yield a procedure for abduction and, surprisingly, for saturation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of formal logic in the context of access control is now well-established. Logic has been used to model and reason about access policies starting with the work of Abadi et al. [2] ; proof theory has been used to enforce access policies in architectures like proof-carrying authorization [3, 6, 7, 17, 24, 27] , and to prove meta-properties of policies [16] ; logic programming, both top-down and bottom-up, has been used to efficiently determine consequences of policies [9, 13, 23] and as the basis of privacy analysis of policies [8] ; logical abduction has been used to determine credentials needed to authorize a specific access [10] ; and, logics embedded in type systems have been used to statically enforce access policies in programming language interfaces [4, 20, 26] . In fact, logic has been so widely used in access control that several specialized logics, called access control logics, have been proposed exclusively for representing and reasoning about access policies. Technically, all access control logics are modal logics, containing at least one principal indexed modality A says ϕ (principal A supports the truth of formula ϕ), used to represent authenticated statements made by individuals participating in the access control process.
The primary focus of study in the area of access control logics in the past decade has been proof theory (symbolic proofs); semantics, when studied, have been second-rate citizens because it is unclear what role they could play in practice. Unlike other applications of logic, where real-world situations correspond to a logic's models and the semantics connect logical formulas to their interpretations in the real world, there are no known interesting connections between models of access control logics (which are specializations of the standard Kripke models of modal logic) and actual access control systems.
In this paper we argue that despite the fact that Kripke semantics of access control logics are not useful to formalize real-world access control systems, such semantics are useful to solve the following relevant problems in the use of access control logics:
-Countermodel generation: Producing evidence of why an access is denied, or why it does not follow from a given policy. (Existence of a sound countermodel producing procedure also implies decidability.) -Saturation or finding all consequences of an access policy. -Abduction or determining which additional credentials suffice to authorize an access.
All three problems are important for enforcement of access policies. Countermodels enable a reference monitor to justify to a principal why it has been denied access: If a policy represented as a formula P does not entail an authorization represented as formula ϕ, then the reference monitor can provide a countermodel for P → ϕ, thus justifying the denial of authorization ϕ. Saturation is necessary to pre-compile policies and to cache their consequences. Abduction is useful for finding missing credentials and for justifying authorizations on-the-fly, as in the Grey system [7] .
The main contribution of this paper is in showing that all the above problems can be solved using the single foundational formalism of labeled sequent calculi, which are symbolic proof systems that directly mimic Kripke semantics of the logic in the inference rules [5] . Working with a specific access control logic, a propositional variant of the logic BL [17] , we show how its labeled sequent calculus can be used to obtain an easily implementable decision procedure which produces countermodels when no proof exists, how the generated countermodels can be used to find all consequences of a policy, and how the labeled sequent calculus can be adapted to find additional credentials that suffice to authorize a given access. Throughout the paper, we combine ideas from Kripke semantics with those from proof theory.
It is well known that proving decidability of multi-modal logics like ours is a challenging problem due to interactions between modalities, which can cause decision procedures to loop (see [21] for examples). Producing countermodels is even harder. Our technical work is complicated further by our decision to use an intuitionistic logic instead of a classical logic. We make this choice because intuitionistic logics are known to be a better fit for modeling access policies than classical logics. However, the choice requires us to introduce and handle an additional preorder to model implication in the Kripke semantics, thus creating another source of interaction in all our algorithms. Our eventual underlying decision procedure is an extension of our prior, general result for modal logics [15] . The extension is non-trivial because our logic BL sf includes the connective A sf B (principal A speaks for principal B) that stipulates relations between accessibility relations in Kripke models. The connective is used to represent unrestricted delegation in access control [2] .
Saturation of access control policies to derive all consequences is a well-studied technique used in many policy engines like SecPAL [9] . Unlike the conventional, syntactic approach of using forward chaining to find the consequenceset of a policy, our approach uses a completely novel, and somewhat surprising technique based on sets of countermodels obtained from labeled sequent calculi. Abduction for access control policies written in a small fragment of finite domain, first-order logic, Datalog, has been studied by Becker et al. [10] . Although we do not consider quantifiers directly in this paper, our abduction result is more general because quantifiers over finite domains can be trivially eliminated and we work with an entire logic, not a fragment.
Organization: In Section II we introduce the logic we use, BL sf . After an informal description of the logic, we present the foundations of our work: the Kripke semantics (Section II-A) and the labeled sequent calculus (Section II-B). In Section III, we present our countermodel producing decision procedure, which also forms the basis of saturation and abduction, which are presented in Sections IV and V, respectively. Section VI discusses related work and Section VII concludes the paper with some directions for future work. Proofs of theorems are presented in the appendix. To keep the presentation concise, straightforward inference rules are deferred to an accompanying technical report (TR in the sequel) [19] .
II. BL sf : THE ACCESS CONTROL LOGIC BL sf is propositional intuitionistic logic extended with two connectives, commonly used to model access policies: A says ϕ (principal A supports formula ϕ) and A sf B (principal A speaks for principal B) 1 . The syntax of BL sf formulas is shown below. p denotes an atomic formula, drawn from a countable set of symbols, and A, B denote principals drawn from a different, finite set I. The connectives (true), ⊥ (false), ∧ (and), ∨ (or) and → (implication) have usual meanings.
(We do not include first-order quantifiers, but those ranging over a finite domain I of individuals can be defined in the usual way:
Although we formally define the semantics of BL sf in Section II-A, we present here some admissible axioms with their common names from literature.
(All intuitionistic propositional tautologies)
Rule (nec) and axiom (K) are standard in modal logic; they are needed to treat A says ϕ as a normal necessitation modality (with index A). Axiom (I) has been argued by Abadi [1] as one of the weakest axioms needed to correctly model delegation in logic using A says ϕ. Axiom (speaksfor) characterizes the formula A sf B: If A sf B, then any statement ϕ that A makes is echoed by B, so the formula A sf B means that A has authority to speak on behalf of B [2] . Example 1. We illustrate our logic using an example from prior work [14] . Consider a simple policy containing the following 3 formulas. Here, file1 is a file, deletefile1 means that file1 should be deleted and admin, Alice and Bob are principals.
1) (admin says deletefile1) → deletefile1 2) admin says ((Bob says deletefile1) → deletefile1) 3) Alice sf Bob The first formula means that if admin says that file1 should be deleted, then this should be the case. The second formula says that admin trusts Bob to decide that file1 should be deleted. The third formula means that Alice is trusted to make statements on Bob's behalf. If P is the set of formulas 1-3, then from P and the assumption Alice says deletefile1, we can derive deletefile1 in BL sf , as may also be expected intuitively.
A. Kripke Semantics
The meaning of BL sf 's connectives are formally defined through semantics written in the style of Kripke, which is standard for modal logics [12] . In the Kripke style, a model of the logic contains several points called worlds, which represent possible states of knowledge. To interpret modalities, binary accessibility relations on worlds are stipulated, with one relation S A for every modality (A says ·). Intuitively, if wS A w then principal A believes that world w is a potential (knowledge) successor of the world w. Intuitionistic implication is modeled using a binary preorder, ≤.
We treat the formula A sf B as an atom in the Kripke semantics and validate axioms related to it, e.g., (speaksfor), through conditions on Kripke frames. This interpretation is very distinct from earlier interpretations of A sf B, e.g., [2, 14] -
(mon-sf) Properties (refl) and (trans) make ≤ a preorder. Property (mon-S) validates axiom (K). Other properties corresponding to axiom (K) have also been proposed in literature [25, 28] ; our property (mon-S) is a slight simplification of a similar property used by Wolter et al. [28] . Property (I) corresponds to axiom (I). Property (basic-sf) corresponds to axiom (speaksfor). Properties (refl-sf) and (trans-sf) make A sf B reflexive and transitive, respectively. Property (mon) is standard in Kripke models of intuitionistic logics and forces monotonicity of satisfaction (Lemma 5 below). Property (mon-sf) implies that if A sf B holds in a world, then it also holds in all future worlds.
A model without the assignments h and sf , i.e., the tuple (W, ≤, {S A } A∈I ) is also called a frame and the conditions (refl)-(I) on relations above are called frame conditions. Definition 3 (Satisfaction). Given a model M = (W, ≤ , {S A } A∈I , h, sf) and a world w ∈ W , we define the satisfaction relation M |= w : α, read "the world w satisfies formula α in model M", by induction on α as follows: The following is a fundamental property of the Kripke semantics of all intuitionistic modal logics, needed to prove soundness of sequent calculi (Theorem 7).
Proof: By induction on α.
B. SeqC: A Labeled Sequent Calculus
Next, we introduce a labeled sequent calculus for BL sf , which, although a syntactic proof system, derives its inference rules directly from the inductive definition of satisfaction in the Kripke semantics. This labeled sequent calculus, called SeqC, forms the basis of all the remaining work in this paper. Conclusions in SeqC have the form: "Formula ϕ is true in world w", where w is a symbolic world. Hypotheses are assumptions of the same form, as well as symbolic relations between the worlds. Formally, we introduce a syntactic category of labeled formulas, written w : ϕ, to mean that formula ϕ is true in world w. A sequent in our calculus has the form Σ; M; Γ ⇒ Δ, where -Σ is a finite set of world symbols appearing in the rest of the sequent. World symbols are also called labels. -M is a finite set of relations between labels in Σ.
Relations have the forms x ≤ y and xS A y. -Γ is a finite set of labeled formulas. -Δ is a finite set of labeled formulas. Semantically, Σ; M; Γ ⇒ Δ is valid when every model with a world set containing at least Σ, satisfying all relations in M and all labeled formulas in Γ also satisfies at least one labeled formula in Δ. -There is an xRy
Rules of SeqC: Selected rules of the labeled sequent calculus for BL sf are shown in Figure 1 . (For the remaining rules, see our TR.) Rules for each connective mimic the (Kripke) semantic definition of the connective. For example, in the rule (∧R), to prove x : α ∧ β in the conclusion, we prove x : α and x : β in the premises. The conditions (refl)-(monsf) in the definition of Kripke models (Definition 2), with the exception of (mon), are modeled by the frame rules in Figure 1 . Condition (mon) is implicit in the rule (init). In the rules (→R) and (saysR), the world y in the premise is fresh. We say that (Σ; M; Γ ⇒ Δ) if Σ; M; Γ ⇒ Δ has a proof in the calculus. The sequent calculus is both sound and complete with respect to the semantics.
Proof: Fix an M. It is easily proved by induction on the given derivation of Σ; M; Γ ⇒ Δ that for every mapping ρ,
The converse of Theorem 7, completeness, also holds but we do not prove the result here because it is a consequence of the correctness of our countermodel producing decision procedure. The following theorem is central to the proof of termination of our decision procedure. Proof: By induction on the distance (in the proof tree) of the occurrence of ϕ from the conclusion Σ; M; Γ ⇒ Δ.
III. DECIDABILITY AND COUNTERMODEL GENERATION
Our first application of the labeled sequent calculus SeqC is a decision procedure that provides countermodels if a sequent has no proof. Production of countermodels is of practical use in access control because a countermodel can be used as evidence to justify denial of authorization. Note that backwards search in SeqC does not directly yield a decision procedure because the rules (→R) and (saysR) can be applied indefinitely to produce new worlds. The countermodel producing decision procedure presented here bounds the backwards application of these rules and is based on our prior general result for multimodal logics [15] , which in turn generalizes earlier work on uni-modal tableaux calculi [18] . In the following we present the decision procedure briefly and extend it with the connective A sf B. Readers not interested in understanding how the procedure works may directly skip to Section III-B, which lists the decision procedure as a sequent calculus.
The key idea of our technique is to prevent infinite application of the rules (→R) and (saysR) in backward search by checking for containment of formulas labeling a world in those labeling another. In its naive form, this check results in incompleteness because of the condition (I) and the connective A sf B. To recover completeness, we check containment not between sets of formulas labeling two worlds, but between the sets obtained by applying a suitably chosen function, called Sfor, on those sets. The selection of an appropriate definition for Sfor is the central idea of our decision procedure. Using this function, we define a sub-class of sequents called saturated histories, on which backwards application of any of the rules of Figure 1 is certainly useless. We then use this notion of "uselessness of backwards rule application" to build a decision procedure and use a counting argument based on the weak subformula property (Theorem 8) to show that it terminates. We further show how to extract a countermodel from a saturated history, thus forming the basis of our countermodel extraction.
In the following, we describe the decision procedure, starting with the definition of Sfor and saturated history in Section III-A, followed by the decision procedure itself in Section III-B.
A. Saturated Histories
We use the term history for a tuple Σ; M; Γ; Δ or, equivalently, for a sequent Σ; M; Γ ⇒ Δ. Let T (ϕ) and F (ϕ) be two uninterpreted unary relations. Informally, we read T (ϕ) as "ϕ should be true" and F (ϕ) as "ϕ should be false". Given a history Σ; M; Γ; Δ and x ∈ Σ, the signed formulas of x, written Sfor(Σ; M; Γ; Δ, x) are defined as follows:
The key component in the definition of Sfor is the third one, which must align with the choice of axioms for the modality A says ·. Here, the choice corresponds to the axiom (I). When Σ, M, Γ, Δ are clear from context, we abbreviate Sfor(Σ; M; Γ; Δ, x) to Sfor(x). We say that x y iff Sfor(x) ⊆ Sfor(y). We call a pair M; Γ closed if they are closed under backward application of the frame rules of Figure 1 . (Note that the frame rules of Figure 1 only add elements to M and Γ.) We write M; Γ for the closure of M; Γ by the frame rules.
We call a frame M tree-like if it can be derived from a finite tree of the relations ≤ and S A and (possibly partial) closure by frame rules. This tree is called the underlying tree of M and we say that x y (in M) iff there is a directed path from x to y in the tree underlying M.
The key definition in our method is that of a saturated history. Intuitively, this definition characterizes those histories Σ; M; Γ; Δ for which we can directly define a countermodel for the sequent Σ; M; Γ ⇒ Δ. (The definition of this countermodel is given soon after the definition of a saturated history.) Axiom Rules M is tree-like, it has a relation defined on it.) 2) If x : p ∈ Γ, then there is no y such that x ≤ y ∈ M and y : p ∈ Δ. 3) There is no x such that x : ∈ Δ. 4) There is no x such that x : ⊥ ∈ Γ.
a) There is a y such that x ≤ y ∈ M, y : α ∈ Γ and y : β ∈ Δ or b) There is a y such that y = x, y x and x y. 11) If x : A says α ∈ Γ and xS A y ∈ M, then y : α ∈ Γ. 12) If x : A says α ∈ Δ, then either: a) There is a y such that xS A y ∈ M and y : α ∈ Δ or b) There is a y such that y = x, y x and x y. 
It is not obvious that CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) is a model, because it may not satisfy the monotonicity condition, (mon), for h. It trivially satisfies all other conditions in the definition of a model. Lemma 11 states that the monotonicity condition (mon) must also always hold for CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ). 
B. SeqC T : Countermodel Producing Decision Procedure
We synthesize a countermodel producing decision procedure for BL sf using the idea of saturated histories and the definition of the countermodel CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ). We present the decision procedure as a sequent calculus, SeqC T , with judgments of the form Σ; M; Γ ⇒ T Δ S, where S is a possibly empty, finite set of (counter)models. Reading the rules backwards, the calculus is an algorithm with inputs Σ, M, Γ and Δ and output S. The correctness properties of the algorithm are that: (1) Given any Σ, M, Γ and Δ with tree-like M, the algorithm terminates and produces some S. The requirement that M be tree-like is needed to complete the proofs. In practice, we start from an empty M, which is trivially tree-like.
Selected rules of the calculus SeqC T are shown in Figure 2 . With the exception of the new rule (CM), each rule in the calculus corresponds to a rule of the same name in SeqC (Figure 1) . The difference between the calculi is that there are additional conditions on each rule in SeqC T , which are written in boxes in the figure. These are called applicability conditions. There are two key points to observe here. First, by design, if the applicability conditions of all rules in the figure fail, i.e., no rule (except CM) applies, then the tuple Σ; M; Γ; Δ in the conclusion of the rule is a saturated history. Therefore, by Corollary 13, Σ; M; Γ ⇒ Δ has a countermodel, which is output into S using the rule (CM). Second, all rules of the calculus except (CM) simply aggregate the countermodels from their premises into a single set in the conclusion. This is sound because all rules of the Figure 1 are invertible, so any countermodel of any of the premises is necessarily a countermodel of the conclusion. The following lemmas and theorems state termination and partial correctness of SeqC T . Note that Theorem 14(2) does not stipulate that the computed S be unique. Indeed, depending on the order in which the rules of the calculus ⇒ T are applied to a given sequent, S may be different. However, the fact that at least one such S exists and can be computed is enough to get decidability for BL sf .
Theorem 15 (Correctness). For a tree-like M, suppose that S is such that (Σ; M; Γ ⇒ T Δ S) (such an S must exist and can be computed using Theorem 14) . Then: 
IV. POLICY SATURATION
Our second application of the labeled sequent calculus SeqC is policy saturation, the problem of generating all possible atomic consequences of a given policy. This is useful, e.g., to pre-compile a policy to access control lists. The usual approach to policy saturation is based in bottom-up logic programming engines like Datalog, used in the context of access control in systems like SecPAL [9] . We show that, surprisingly, our construction of countermodels from Section III-B directly yields a completely different algorithm to find all atomic consequences of a policy.
Our algorithm works as follows. Suppose we wish to find all atomic consequences of the policy ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n . We choose a symbolic world x and run the decision procedure of Section III-B with Σ = x, M = ·, Γ = x : ϕ 1 , . . . , x : ϕ n and Δ = ·. If the algorithm ends with S = {}, then the policy is (clearly) inconsistent and it proves any atomic formula. If, on the other hand, the algorithm ends with S = {}, then as the following theorem states, x : p is provable from Γ iff x ∈ h(p) in every model M in S. Thus, by running
Axiom Rules
No other rule applies our decision procedure on the policy with an empty goal and intersecting the valuation of the initial worlds in the ensuing countermodels, we obtain exactly the set of all provable atoms. We call this property comprehensiveness.
Theorem 18 (Comprehensiveness). Suppose M is tree-like and (Σ;
Proof: See Appendix D, Theorem 34.
Example 19. Let P be the set of formulas 1-3 from Example 1 and let P = P, Alice says deletefile1. We intuitively expect that the only atomic consequence of P is deletefile1. Using the saturation procedure described above, we confirm this intuition. When we run the sequent x; ·; x : P ⇒ T · . . . through the procedure of Figure 2 , it produces exactly one countermodel with one world x, the relations x ≤ x, and the assignments h(deletefile1) = {x} and sf (A, B) = {x}. Using Theorem 18, we conclude that the only atomic consequence of the policy is deletefile1, which is also what we expected intuitively.
V. POLICY ABDUCTION
Next, we adapt the labeled sequent calculus SeqC to a procedure for abduction over access policies written in BL sf . Abduction is the problem of finding credentials that together with a given policy Γ prove a given goal ϕ. These missing credentials, the output of abduction, are represented by a formula, often called the abducible. For example, if Γ entails ϕ then no additional credentials are required and the abducible is . Similarly, for Γ = q → p, (r ∧ s) → p and ϕ = p, the abducible is p ∨ q ∨ (r ∧ s). In practice, abducibles are restricted to formulas of specific forms that can be easily justified a priori (without assumptions).
In the following, we adapt the terminating calculus SeqC T of Section III-B to obtain a general abduction method for BL sf . Our abducibles are simple formulas containing the connectives ∧, ∨ and formulas , ⊥, p and A says p at the leaves, as formalized in the following definition.
We do not allow formulas of the forms ϕ → ψ and A sf B in abducibles because we want that abducibles be easy to justify a priori; this is true for formulas of the above restricted forms, but is not the case for arbitrary formulas.
The abduction procedure is presented as a calculus SeqC A , whose selected rules are shown in Figure 3 . The calculus is an adaptation of the terminating calculus SeqC T of Figure 2 , obtained by replacing the output countermodels with abducibles. Its sequents have the form Σ; M; Γ ⇒ A Δ Θ. The applicability conditions are the same, so backwards search in the calculus terminates as it does for SeqC T . The main rule is AB, which is a replacement of the earlier rule CM. In this rule, the input contexts Σ; M; Γ; Δ are a saturated history, so the output is an abducible, AB(Σ; M; Γ; Δ), which is defined below. Here, root(M) is the root of the underlying tree of M.
AB(Σ;
Intuitively, for every labeled atom y : p ∈ Δ, we look at the path between the root of the underlying tree of M and y. Because the saturated history is closed under backward application of rules (I), (mon-S) and (trans), either (root(M)) ≤ y ∈ M or (root(M))S A y ∈ M for some A ∈ I. In the former case, it suffices to add the credential p to complete the proof and in the latter case it suffices to add the credential A says p to complete the proof. If both sets in the definition of AB(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) are empty, then AB(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) = ⊥. This can happen only if we start from a sequent that contains ⊥ in positive positions (i.e., as subgoals).
An abducible Θ is satisfied by extending the current policy Γ with a set F ⊆ {p, A says p | A ∈ I}. Given such a set, we define the satisfaction relation F |= Θ in the obvious way:
The following theorem states that our abduction procedure is sound in the sense that if the abducible of a sequent is satisfied by F , then extending the hypotheses with F results in a provable sequent.
Proof: See Appendix E, Theorem 35.
Example 21. Let P be the set of formulas 1-3 from Example 1. These facts do not entail deletefile1, so we can try to run our abduction algorithm. When we run the sequent x; ·; x : P ⇒ A x : deletefile1 . . . through the procedure of Figure 3 , all branches except one close. That one branch ends in a saturated history with three worlds x, y, z, relations xS admin y, yS Bob z, yS Alice z, xS Bob z, xS Alice z, x ≤ x, y ≤ y, z ≤ z, and a Δ containing x : deletefile1, y : deletefile1 and z : deletefile1. Consequently, the abducible is the formula deletefile1 ∨ (admin says deletefile1) ∨ (Bob says deletefile1) ∨ (Alice says deletefile1), i.e., our goal deletefile1 can be proved if any of admin, Bob, Alice assert it. This is exactly what we expect from an informal analysis of the policy.
VI. RELATED WORK
We discuss closely related work on decision procedures, saturation and abduction for access control logics.
A procedure to generate countermodels in the context of access control is new to our work, but the importance of this idea has been anticipated before. Regarding decision procedures, there are some decidability results for access control logics, e.g., for the logic ICL [14] and the logic programming language SecPAL [9] , but for the logic presented in this paper, the decidability result is also new. Our specific countermodel producing decision procedure is based on our prior work on multi-modal logics [15] , which in turn is inspired by work for uni-modal logics, notably that of Gasquet et al. [18] and Negri [21, 22] . In terms of presentation, our labeled sequent calculus is presented is similar to that of Negri [21] .
The idea of saturation for access policies has been investigated several times, notably in access control languages like SecPAL and Binder whose implementations or semantics are defined by translation into Datalog [9, 13] . Our technique of saturating policies using a comprehensive set of countermodels is novel. Saturation by translation to Datalog is likely more efficient than our method, but our method is more general because it covers all connectives of the logic.
Abduction for access policies has been investigated formally by Becker et al. [10, 11] in the context of SecPAL. Their procedure is based on an adaptation of a tabled logic programming engine. Our algorithm is more general because it handles all
Axiom Rules
No other rule applies connectives of the logic, but may be less efficient. Abductive credential gathering for access policies has been implemented several times using heuristics, e.g., in the Grey system [7] .
VII. CONCLUSION
Using a specific access control logic BL sf , we have argued that Kripke semantics, manifest in the symbolic framework of labeled sequent calculi, can be used to solve three practical access control problems: Countermodel generation, policy saturation, and policy abduction. The foundational underpinning of our work is a non-trivial, countermodel producing decision procedure for the logic BL sf . The same decision procedure yields algorithms for policy saturation and abduction.
In future work, we plan to implement our algorithms and evaluate them on realistic access policies. The main challenge we anticipate is that our algorithms, as presented in this paper, have significant computational complexity, and may be inefficient in practice. To alleviate this problem, we plan to investigate adaptations of our techniques to goaldirected (backchaining) search, which is usually very efficient in practice. The adaptation is likely to be non-trivial because, unlike the rules of the sequent calculus of Figure 1 , rules of goal-directed search are non-invertible, which may make construction of countermodels very difficult.
Proof: By induction on iteration of frame rules that leads to the closure (M ∪ C); Γ. (1) is straightforward. For (2), we need some Lemmas. First, we prove that for any intermediate result
Using this we prove that if x : A sf B ∈ Γ n , then x : A sf B ∈ Γ. The critical rules are (mon1-sf) and (mon2-sf). Finally, we prove the required statement. The critical rule is (basic-sf).
Lemma 23 (Lemma 11). If Σ; M; Γ; Δ is a saturated history, then CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) has a monotonic valuation h, i.e., x ∈ h(p) and x ≤ y ∈ CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) imply y ∈ h(p).
Proof:
Suppose that x ≤ y ∈ CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ), i.e., x ≤ y ∈ M and x ∈ h(p). From the latter, there is a z such that z ≤ x ∈ M and z : p ∈ Γ. From Lemma 22(1) it follows that x(≤ ∪ C)
* y, where all the relations ≤ are in M. Hence, we have a chain
-For i = 0, x 0 = x and we know that z : p ∈ Γ and z ≤ x ∈ M. It follows from definition of Sfor that T (p) ∈ Sfor(x), as required. -For the induction step, assume that T (p) ∈ Sfor(x i ). We prove that T (p) ∈ Sfor(x i+1 ). We consider two possible cases on the relation
). This completes the inductive proof that T (p) ∈ Sfor(x i ). In particular, T (p) ∈ Sfor(x n ). By definition of Sfor, there is a z such that z ≤ x n ∈ M and z : p ∈ Γ. This immediately implies x n ∈ h(p), i.e., y ∈ h(p), as required.
Lemma 24 (Lemma 12).
The following hold for any saturated history Σ; M; Γ; Δ:
We prove both properties simultaneously by lexicographic induction, first on ϕ, and then on the partial (tree-like) order of M. (Note that we cannot induct on either M or the relation in CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ), because both of these may potentially be cyclic.) Since the context Σ; M; Γ; Δ is fixed here, we abbreviate Sfor(Σ; M; Γ; Δ, x) to Sfor(x). Let C be the set {(x, y) | x y}.
Proof of A.
Case. ϕ = p. We are given that T (p) ∈ Sfor(x) and want to prove that CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : p. Since T (p) ∈ Sfor(x), we know from definition of the function Sfor that there is a y with y ≤ x ∈ M and y : p ∈ Γ. Since y ≤ x ∈ M, we know from definition of CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) that x ∈ h(p). Hence, by definition of |=, we have CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : p.
is trivial by the definition of |=.
Case. ϕ = ⊥. Then the pre-condition T (⊥) ∈ Sfor(x) or, equivalently, x : ⊥ ∈ Δ is impossible by clause (3) of the definition of saturated history. So this case is vacuous.
Case. ϕ = α ∧ β. We are given that T (α ∧ β) ∈ Sfor(x) or, equivalently, that x : α ∧ β ∈ Γ. By clause (5) Case. ϕ = α ∨ β. We are given that T (α ∨ β) ∈ Sfor(x) or, equivalently, that x : α ∨ β ∈ Γ. By clause (7) of the definition of saturated history, either x : α ∈ Γ or x : β ∈ Γ. Hence, either T (α) ∈ Sfor(x) or T (β) ∈ Sfor(x). By the i.h., either CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : α or CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : β. In either case, CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : α ∧ β, as required. • For i = 0, x 0 = x and we are given that T (α → β) ∈ Sfor(x), so we are done.
• For the inductive case, assume that T (α → β) ∈ Sfor(x i ) for some i. We show that T (α → β) ∈ Sfor(x i+1 ). We consider two possible cases on the relation
). This completes the inductive proof. It follows, in particular, that T (α → β) ∈ Sfor(x n ). Consequently, there is some z such that z ≤ x n = y ∈ M and z : α → β ∈ Γ. Hence, by clause (9) of the definition of saturated history, we must have either y : α ∈ Δ or y : β ∈ Γ. The former implies, by the i.h., that CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= y : α, which contradicts our assumption that CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= y : α. So, we must have y : β ∈ Γ. This implies T (β) ∈ Sfor(y) and hence, by the i.h., that CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= y : β.
Case. ϕ = A says α. We are given that T (A says α) ∈ Sfor(x). We need to show that CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : A says α, i.e., for any y such that xS A y in the model, we have CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= y : α. Pick any y such that xS A y in the model. By Lemma 22 (2) • For i = 0, x 0 = x and we are given that T (A says α) ∈ Sfor(x).
• For the inductive case, assume that T (A says α) ∈ Sfor(x i ) for some i. We show that T (A says α) ∈ Sfor(x i+1 ) by case analyzing the relation
). Since we just proved that T (A says α) ∈ Sfor(x i ), it follows, in particular, that T (A says α) ∈ Sfor(x n ). Consequently, there is some z such that z (≤ ∪ S * ) * x n ∈ M and z : A says α ∈ Γ. Then, we also have (within M) that: z (≤ ∪ S * ) * x n S A y. So, due to conditions (I) and (mon-S), z S A y ∈ M. Hence, by clause (11) of the definition of saturated history, we must have y : α ∈ Γ. Therefore, T (α) ∈ Sfor(y) and by the i.h., CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= y : α.
Case. ϕ = A sf B. We are given that T (A sf B) ∈ Sfor(x) and want to show that CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : A sf B. From the assumption T (A sf B) ∈ Sfor(x) we know that x : A sf B ∈ Γ, so by the definition of CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ), we have x ∈ sf (A, B) . Hence, by definition of |=, we get that CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : A sf B.
Proof of B.
Case. ϕ = p. We are given that F (p) ∈ Sfor(x) or, equivalently, that x : p ∈ Δ. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : p. Then, x ∈ h(p) and hence, from the construction of the countermodel, there is a z such that z ≤ x ∈ M and z : p ∈ Γ. This immediately contradicts clause (2) of the definition of saturated history because we have z ≤ x ∈ M, z : p ∈ Γ and x : p ∈ Δ. Hence we must have CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : p.
Case. ϕ = . Then the pre-condition F ( ) ∈ Sfor(x) or, equivalently, x : ∈ Δ is impossible by clause (3) of the definition of saturated history. So this case is vacuous.
Case. ϕ = ⊥. Here, CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : ⊥ is trivial by the definition of |=.
Hence, by clause (6) of the definition of saturated history, either x : α ∈ Δ or x : β ∈ Δ. Therefore, either F (α) ∈ Sfor(x) or F (β) ∈ Sfor(x). By i.h., either CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : α or CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : β. In either case, CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : α ∧ β. (A, B) . So, by definition of |=, we get that CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) |= x : A sf B, as required.
B. SeqC CM : Countermodels for BL sf
We define an intermediate sequent calculus SeqC CM , written ⇒ CM , which uses the notion of saturated histories to emit countermodels from unprovable sequents. Although this calculus is not a decision procedure, we find it a useful step in proving several results, including the correctness of the terminating calculus SeqC T as well as the results on saturation.
Sequents of SeqC CM have the form Σ; M; Γ ⇒ CM Δ S, where S is a finite set of finite models. We write
S) with S = {}, then every model M ∈ S is a countermodel to Σ; M; Γ ⇒ Δ in the sense of (the converse of) Definition 6.
Selected rules of the sequent calculus SeqC CM are shown in Figure 4 . First, every rule in the ordinary sequent calculus (Figure 1 ) is modified to have in the conclusion the union of the (counter)models in the premises. This is sound because the rules of the sequent calculus are invertible (i.e., the conclusion of each rule holds iff the premises hold). Second, there is a new rule (CM) that produces the countermodel CM(Σ; M; Γ; Δ) when Σ; M; Γ; Δ is a saturated history.
We emphasize again that this calculus is not necessarily a decision procedure because it includes all rules of ⇒ and hence admits all of the latter's infinite backwards derivations as well. Proof: By induction on the given derivation of Σ; M; Γ ⇒ CM Δ S and case analysis of its last rule. For all other rules, except (CM), we simply observe that contexts in all major premises are a superset of corresponding contexts in the conclusion and hence we can trivially conclude by induction on one of the premises. The case of rule (CM) is immediate from Corollary 13. Proof: By backwards analysis of each rule observing that the M in the premises of each rule is tree-like if that in the conclusion is.
Note that the underlying tree of M in any sequent of a backward proof search starting from a single formula consists of exactly those edges that are introduced in one of the rules (→R) and (saysR). Proof: Proof of (1): Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is an infinite backward proof starting from Σ; M; Γ ⇒ T Δ . . .. Since the proof is finitely branching (every rule has a bounded number of premises), it must have an infinite path. Observe that M, Γ, Δ are monotonic backwards, so the applicability conditions in the rules prevent application of the same rule on the same principal labeled formula more than once in any branch. Since there are only a finite number of formulas that can appear in any search (weak subformula property, Theorem 8), it follows that in the infinite path there must be an infinite number of labels. Let T be the underlying tree of this entire path (i.e., the underlying tree of the union of M for each sequent on this path). Since the tree is finitely branching (because we cannot apply rules (→R) and (saysR) to the same label infinitely often), it must have an infinite path. Let this path be x 0 x 1 . . .. Let S i be the value of Sfor(x i ) when either of the rules (→R) and (saysR) is applied to create x i+1 . Note that for i < j, S i ⊇ S j , because if S i ⊇ S j , then at the time that x j+1 is created, Sfor(x i ) ⊇ S i ⊇ S j = Sfor(x j ), so the application of the rules (→R) and (saysR) on x j would be blocked, so x j+1 could not have been created. Hence, for i < j, S i ⊇ S j . Call this fact (A). (The reader may note that the deduction Sfor(x i ) ⊇ S i two sentences ago relies on the fact that Sfor(x) increases monotonically as we move backwards in a derivation.)
If Φ is the set of all subformulas of the original sequent we start from, together with formulas of the form A sf B where A, B are in the sequent, then by Theorem 8, each S i ⊆ {T (α) | α ∈ Φ} ∪ {F (α) | α ∈ Φ}. Note that the right hand side is a finite set, so its subsets form a finite partial order under set inclusion. Call this partial order P . Since P is finite, it has a finite number of chains and since the sequence S 1 , S 2 , . . . is infinite, at least one infinite subsequence R of S 1 , S 2 , . . . must contain elements from only a single chain in P . Consider any two elements S i , S j ∈ P with i < j. Since P is a chain, we must have either S i ⊇ S j or S i S j .
